EDITORIAL
November 3, 2004
Now that the November 2004 Presidential election is over, it is the time for Americans to start
preparing for the increasing number of body bags that are going to start coming home from Iraq.
Why do you think that major military actions have not commenced against Fallujah and other
enemy strongholds since the cessation of the capture of Fallujah in April 2004? It is much
more than just having a shortage of troops, spare parts, munitions, and armored vehicles.
Street-by-street, building-by-building combat is extremely costly, dangerous, deadly, and can
be extremely destructive. It is costly in supplies, equipment, and munitions. It is deadly to
civilian non-combatants caught in the crossfire and very destructive to their property.
This kind of combat--urban warfare--takes a lot of troops and is costly in lives. Troops have
been pulled from South Korea, Europe, and other areas of the world. National Guard units have
been mobilized and sent to Iraq. Troops that have survived the heat, dust, and the war and are
expecting to finally come home are suddenly having their enlistments and tour of duty in Iraq
extended. Unfortunately, some of these troops have been killed during their forced extended tour of duty.
U.S. troops have overwhelming firepower, superior training, and superior weapons both on the
ground and in the air, but the enemy has the element of surprise and has had time since
April 2004 to plan, resupply, and prepare their defenses. U.S. troops face the dangers from
snipers, cross-fire, booby-traps, IEDs, RPGs, mines, and hit-and-run tactics. The enemy
intimately knows his territory; the attacker does not. U.S. troops have heavy armor, artillery,
night-vision capability, real-time aerial surveillance, maps and aerial images of the area,
but the enemy knows every nook and cranny, every passageway, hall, and tunnel, every street
and window.
A large increase in the number of dead United States military personnel coming home from Iraq
in body bags would have seriously hurt Bush's chances for reelection. Hence, major battles
have been avoided. Combat has been conducted with the primary goal of keeping body count at a
minimum. This policy on major battles will change now that Bush has won reelection.
A secret Pentagon committee, the Office of Special Plans, was set up by Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. This committee was
responsible for providing the National Security Council, Vice President Cheney, National
Security Adviser Rice, and Rumsfeld with, among other things, intelligence on Iraq's weapons
program. The 'intelligence' on weapons of mass destruction turned out to be wrong.
White House officials used the information it received from the Office of Special Plans to
win support from the public and Congress to start the war in Iraq even though the White House
knew much of the information was of a dubious nature, Pentagon officials also listened to
self-serving 'intelligence' from Iraq exiles from the Iraqi National Congress which was headed
by Ahmad Chalabi. Chalabi's main goal, in spite what he told the Pentagon, was to get rid of
Saddam Hussein by any means and hopefully get himself and his cohorts installed as Iraqi
government leaders. At the beginning of the war, Chalabi's name was in news media frequently
and he was paid millions of dollars for his advice and 'Iraqi intelligence.' As the U.S.
began to find Chalabi's 'intelligence' self-serving and usually incorrect, he fell out of the
Defense Department's favor and he was pushed into the background.
Bush, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and other top civilian officials did not listen the top U.S.
military leaders regarding the number of troops that would be required not only for the
initial battle, but to maintain the peace afterwards. Because they tried to conduct the Iraqi
war on the cheap with mobile, rapid-deployment units and lower numbers of troops, we are
today facing the current Iraqi problems. Because the U.S. did not plan properly for operations
after the initial attack and the fall of Baghdad and did not have the necessary number of
troops to keep the peace and secure the hospitals, museums, munitions dumps, and other areas,
everyday citizens and criminals looted the cities. Once chaos started to set in and the enemy
saw that the U.S. was doing very little or nothing about the looting, they looted munitions
and explosives in addition to supplies that were hidden before the Iraqi war commenced.
The U.S., while it never had doubts that it could overthrow Hussein, was surprised how rapidly
the U.S. troops were able to advance to Baghdad. It was so fast that they outran their supply
lines and faced shortages of fuel (M1 Abrams battle tanks use a lot of fuel), water, and fresh
food causing the troops to periodically have to pause to be resupplied. They were also very
tired from many hours on the go. U.S. troops also bypassed major towns and cities which left
long supply lines vulnerable to hit-and-run attacks from militants from these towns and cities.
Hussein had stated that since the Iraqi military could not match the U.S. military's
technology and firepower that the Iraqi military forces would fight and fall back, fight and
fall back, and drop back into the cities. Then they would fight a hit-and-run, guerilla-type warfare.
The enemy is now executing this strategy, plus their ranks have reinforced by outside
militants, terrorists, disillusioned Iraqis, and former Hussein followers. They have used
brutal kidnappings to stir emotions because kidnappings are extremely effective in creating
publicity. The number of car bomb, RPG, and IED attacks is growing. The enemy's goal is create
chaos, disillusionment, and hopefully civil war by inflicting as many casualties and deaths
as possible regardless of who is killed or maimed.
The U.S. military has overwhelming military technology and firepower. But military might has
its limitations in house-to-house combat. How effective can this overwhelming power be against
the enemy in a city containing three hundred thousand civilians? With all of the advanced
warning of attack most of the enemy, especially the upper leadership, has probably left the
city anyway. A large portion of the civilian population has evacuated, too.
Do you level everything in order to rout and kill the enemy that stayed to fight? What
long-term repercussions, political and otherwise, does this action have? How much long-term
animosity does it create? At what point is a nation's thought changed from a positive one of
liberation to a negative one of death, destruction, and hate? Will the war destabilize the
surrounding areas and create even greater unrest? And once the combat is over, who pays for
the rebuilding of the city?
Iraq, just like Vietnam, is turning out to be a prime example of what happens when civilians
start and attempt to manage a war for political and self purposes. Civilians were placed in
the command structure over the military to keep the military from running amuck. But, in
this case, it appears that the military was checkmated into a blind alley. America's finest
are paying the price in traumatic stress syndrome, blood, lost limbs, and death and the U.S.
taxpayers are paying the war's cost while a few companies with the inside track are making
millions of dollars in profit.
